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ABSTRACT 
 
Recent work on pricing has shown that neo-classical microeconomic theory (NCMT) is 
preferred to tendering theory and that implied by absorption, or full-cost, pricing of 
construction work because of its explicit treatment of market conditions, competitor 
behaviour and firm capacity levels.  Applying NCMT in practice, however, requires the 
consideration of pricing from a marketing perspective.  This paper examines the challenges 
involved in terms of the two prevalent marketing paradigms – marketing mix and 
relationship marketing– to pricing construction work generally, and the traditional 
contracting (TC), design and construction (D&C) and speculative building (SB) procurement 
systems in particular. 
 
In general, the marketing mix (MM) approach, having the closest fit with NCMT, is most 
aligned to current practice.  However, conceptual and practical limitations are identified.   
Relationship marketing (RM) is theoretically more applicable, yet has been largely 
overlooked in practice due to the transaction costs and investment involved.  Nevertheless, 
some RM tools are increasingly being adopted in response to demand criteria and clients’ 
needs for continuous improvement, offering a challenge to NCMT related pricing. 
   
In terms of specific procurement arrangements, SB would seem most suited to the MM 
approach over the long term as it is closest to consumer good markets.  D&C on the other 
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hand is considered to be the most price-sensitive to demand factors, with SB the least 
because of its ability to control resources, specifically land and financial packages, whilst TC 
is most suited to developing RM practices. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
Most studies of construction pricing have been carried out by practitioners such as quantity 
surveyors, cost consultants or economists.  These, however, are concerned with practical 
aspects and lack a comprehensive conceptual framework for analysis, while economics, 
though possessing a vast and sophisticated theoretical apparatus, is acknowledged by many 
to fail to produce much of practical value to price-setters.  As a result, the formal education 
of practitioners, for example, proceeds on the basis of a set of very basic and unlikely 
precepts: 
 
i. Economics provides a theoretical basis, yet is generally aimed at providing a 
rationalisation of pricing behaviour rather than providing a basis for making practical 
pricing decisions 
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ii. Practitioner pricing (PP) provides the necessary practical basis for pricing, yet is at best 
partial in application because of the overemphasis on costs at the expense of market 
considerations beyond appreciation of intensive competition as ‘price-takers’. 
 
 
Marketing, on the other hand, claims concern for the theory and practice of pricing, price 
being part of a broader ‘value equation’ from added design value to after sales services. 
Differentiating the product is used by producers to create price differentials and the market 
acts back to stimulate producers to stratify prices.  This is in line with NCMT, yet these 
forces lead firms to offer a series of products and services into the market, which is more 
akin to classical economics of Alfred Marshall than NCTM (Earl 1995) than neo-classical 
assumptions of single product firms.  
 
This paper examines:  
• The relevance of marketing, perhaps as a means of reconciling the economics-PP 
schism;   
• The challenges marketing provides to neoclassical economics and NCMT (Earl 1995; 
Estelami and Maxwell 2003).  
 
Rather than viewing pricing as “a basic economic factor that determines the general lack of 
business activity or the manner in which resources are allocated” (Oxenfeldt 1975:viii), the 
interdependence of pricing and marketing are examined in the context of the construction 
industry. 
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A general framework for pricing decisions is explored using marketing in relation to 
contingent conditions in construction.  The marketing perspectives of pricing for three 
procurement arrangements, namely Traditional Construction (TC), Design & Construct 
(D&C) and Speculative Building (SB), are considered. Generic marketing procedures are 
considered (cf., Nagle and Holden 1995; Oxenfeldt 1964) together with construction-specific 
procedures (e.g. Mochtar and Arditi 2001) for setting pricing strategies. These procedures are 
put into the context of two marketing paradigms for strategic price setting within 
construction. 
 
The conceptual analysis strengthens the notion that pricing construction work has some 
similarities with intermediate and industrial goods and infrastructure, yet is distinct from 
pricing consumer goods.  The rationale of the analysis requires empirical study because of 
the virtual absence of such work to date.  One reason is the lack of research into pricing with 
marketing generally, another reason is sensitivity and confidentiality in construction 
specifically.   
 
 
OVERVIEW OF THE ECONOMICS OF PRICING 
 
Runeson and Skitmore (1999) argued tendering theory (Gates 1967) fails to take into account 
changes in market conditions, competitor behaviour and firm capacity levels.  Conversely, 
Runeson and Raftery (1997) argue NCMT is likely to succeed, which Skitmore et al (2006) 
have supported in contrast to absorption or full-cost pricing. 
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However, Oxenfeldt (1975:10) observes, “[although] pricing has been written about in great 
depth by economists for centuries, many price-setters who have looked for help in a study of 
price theory and the literature on pricing have not found the effort too rewarding”, the reason 
being that economic theory only seeks to explain basic economic forces, hence merely 
rationalise their behaviour rather than guide producers and consumers (Gabor 1977).  The 
assumption that firms in perfect competition sets their own prices with total control of 
production inputs, adequate information on present and future supply and demand, restricts 
applied explanation to a few single product firms dealing mostly in commodity markets. 
Managers acknowledge imperfect competition generally accords with practice (Gabor 1977). 
 
Empirical research supports this view, for example, a positive price-demand relationship has 
been found due to price-quality schemata (e.g., Monroe 1990) which are dependent on the 
type of product (Liechtenstein and Burton 1989), the consumer’s familiarity with the product 
(e.g., Lim and Olshavsky 1988) and contingent upon the state of both consumer and task 
environment variables (e.g., Bettman 1979), recognising that economic theory does not 
necessarily aid setting prices (i.e., lower prices do not automatically stimulate sales), and 
instead practitioners can employ empirical methods to determine price-choice relationships 
for pricing problems (Olshavsky et al 1995) or employ realist methods to conceptually 
determine what is necessary to stimulate sales across a configuration of marketing and 
pricing factors (cf. Smyth et al 2006). 
 
Prices are not impersonal market factors purely driven by inexorable market forces.  Setting 
and changing prices is also behavioural, reflecting perceptions, cognitions, aspirations, and 
preconceptions.  Prices reflect methods of business decision-making, availability of 
information, motivations, expectations and environment (Oxenfeldt 1975).  In practice, prices 
 6 
are generally set through relationships, actors processing data with contextual perceptions of 
the current market and personal experience.  Decision-makers therefore mobilise objective 
and subjective criteria to actively engage with the market.  This is tactical, yet informed by 
strategy concerning objectives for the firm (Kotler 2000).  Basically, price setting is 
conceived as an optimisation problem: “Setting a price too high can have the effect of 
indirectly reducing profits via a reduction in the firm’s market share, while setting a price too 
low can directly reduce a firm’s profits through low profit margin” (Gordon et al 1980:1).  In 
tendering situations high prices result in winning less contracts and low prices win more 
contracts but with less profit in conceptual terms, moderated in practice by contextual 
conditions. 
 
This overview applies to construction: “A realistic model of price determination would need 
to be at home with loose or fuzzy concepts, not feel guilty about the lack of mathematical 
precision and able to cope with erratic non-optimising decisions” (Raftery 1991:146), yet 
empirical research shows pricing in construction does not fully conform to the norms of other 
industries; it successfully borrows elements.  For example, South African firms in the 
chemical and construction industries employ the same organisational structures and costing 
systems and both emphasise costs and competitor prices rather more than buyer behaviour in 
determining price.  They do, however, differ in their pricing objectives, with construction 
firms emphasizing return on investment, while chemical firms emphasize mark-up on cost 
(Abratt and Pitt 1985).  Tendering is largely market-oriented, which includes many 
subjective judgments (Green 1989), however, marketing remains relatively unsophisticated 
and largely intuitive in construction (Smyth 2000). 
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OVERVIEW OF MARKETING AND PRICING 
 
Economics has tried to understand pricing and pricing strategies, whilst reliable models for 
pricing remain elusive (Hoffman et al 2002).  Marketing theory has established models, 
which includes pricing, recognising similarities and differences in objectives, methods and 
procedures between industries (Gordon et al 1980), and between product/service lines.  
“[F]or marketers of industrial goods and construction companies, pricing is the single 
judgement that translates potential business into reality” (Walker 1967:38).  Aspects of 
marketing have been applied in construction and has been shown to have further application 
(Smyth 2000; Preece et al 2003). 
 
There are currently two primary marketing paradigms, the marketing mix (Borden 1964) and 
relationship marketing (Berry 1983).  The marketing mix (MM) was developed in mass 
market consumer goods, utilising the so-called 4Ps of product, place, promotion and price 
(McCarthy 1964) and subsequent variants.  This producer-oriented approach aggregates 
consumers into segments that are then supplied products using the mix of ingredients from 
the 4Ps.  The objective is to maximise sales, hence profit.  The producer accepts the market 
as it is and the consumer is viewed as passive, the transaction-based MM being aligned with 
NCMT. 
 
Relationship marketing (RM) was developed for business-to-business (B2B) relationships, 
especially for intangible services (e.g., Grönroos 2000).  This is customer focused, whereby 
agile production and tailor-made services are configured for “segments of one” (Gummesson 
2001).  The objectives are to add product and service value to provide client satisfaction, 
engender loyalty, and hence, increase repeat business and secure premium profit for the 
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producer from satisfied customers.  The consumer is viewed as active and the producer is a 
proactive market creator and market manager.   
 
RM offers an alternative perspective to MM, yet opportunity for overlap is present.  While 
some (e.g. Kotler et al 1996) emphasise overlap and integration of MM and RM, identifying 
scope for practitioners to amalgamate or transition between the two, tensions and conflicts 
can be overlooked, for example RM is not aligned with NCMT.  RM requires proactive 
market management through systematic organisational and individual behaviour.  At the 
micro-level, RM seeks changes in exchange processes and in the management of product and 
service delivery.  Aggregated organisational behaviour can change the market at sector level, 
for example investment in relationship marketing can increase switching costs and create 
barriers of entry. 
 
Conceptually, MM does not fit construction.  Traditionally, contractors do not design the 
‘product’ and therefore service is the primary aspect contractors can configure.  Most 
contractors offer undifferentiate services, organising themselves into divisions mirroring 
procurement routes originally developed by clients (Smyth, 2006a).  Overall this reduces 
management inputs, with a consequential lack of service communality and standardization in 
management-cum-behavioural terms, projects typically being organised on a one-off basis 
according to a personality (or blame) culture (Pryke and Smyth 2006; Smyth 2000). 
 
‘Place’ refers to distribution channel in marketing theory.  However, logistics and the outlet 
of sale do not easily translate into construction where ‘site’ relates to ‘place’, which is client 
rather than contractor determined.  The procurement route also concerns ‘place’, which at a 
project level clients choose prior to approaching the relevant contractor division because of 
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the structural solutions to marketing adopted by contractors (Smyth 2006a).  Promotion in the 
market is constrained by geographical coverage for small firms and larger firms rely upon 
reputation and referrals, especially from consultants (Smyth 2000).  Promotion is not a major 
issue, especially with undifferentiated services.   
 
Conceptually price becomes the major marketing issue, which accords with practice in a 
fragmented and competitive market.  Whilst Alfred Marshall recognised the importance of 
multi-product firms (Earl 1995) and marketing theory and practice embraces heterogeneous 
product and service markets, constructors tend to offer undifferentiated services.  The 
continuous improvement agenda has largely been “thrown over the wall” as client driven 
(Smyth 2006a) or simply passed along the supply chain (Smyth 2005; Green 2006).  
 
Marketing theory of price and pricing strategies have not always been articulated in empirical 
research (Rao 1984).  The mass market origins of MM have militated against price-based 
research as prices are fixed at an aggregate level, individual exchanges being irrelevant.  This 
does not concur with specific assets in construction markets.  Market leverage of individual 
suppliers and customers (Jain and Laric 1979) continue to exert downward price pressures in 
construction (cf. Cox and Ireland 2006; Green 2006).  Rao (1979) recognized different 
customers value different product and service attributes, enhanced by customer perceptions 
of value (Shapiro and Jackson 1978), and thus accommodate different price structures – 
important in asset specific exchanges yet inhibited in contracts where features and benefits 
cannot easily be sought out and evaluated in advance compared to goods produced ahead of 
sale (Smyth 2000). 
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Conceptually, RM would be expected to closely fit construction services.  Intangible services 
for one-off ‘products’ largely delivered B2B are suited to RM.  In practice, the fragmented 
market of contractors supplying capital intensive services over long contracts in conditions of 
discontinuous workload and project uncertainty have led to transaction cost management 
being to the fore (Gruneberg and Ive 2000; Winch 2002).  Minimising transaction costs 
results in low levels of investment in marketing and particularly RM (Smyth 2000, 2004), 
undifferentiated services and the low service support levels from the head office to projects 
being consequences (Pryke and Smyth 2006; Smyth 2000, 2006a).     
 
Client driven agendas for continuous improvement – partnering, supply chain management 
and lean production – have led to limited changes.  In general, the contractor remains a 
market taker in line with NCMT.  Contractors have responded by adopting the client 
procurement driven model, rather than making a marketing response – the other side of the 
procurement coin (Smyth 2005) – learning the collaborative ‘rhetoric’ and passing the 
agenda along the supply chain(Green 2006).  Continuous improvement, therefore, is 
anchored within the transaction cost domain, including relational contracting (cf. 
Kumaraswamy and Rahman  2006), which seeks reactive behavioural responses to changes 
in governance and market structure, whereas RM, hence relationship management, seek 
proactive and aggregated behavioural change which can change the market if practices 
become widespread (cf. Smyth 2006b).   
 
However, some contractors go beyond relational contracting (RC) on a piecemeal basis, 
making investment into improving relationships and adopting some of the ‘tools’ of RM 
(Kumaraswamy and Rahman  2006; Smyth  2000), which has grown incrementally in recent 
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years, but is yet to constitute systematic approaches to RM and relationship management 
(Pryke and Smyth 2006).   
 
RM theory has also neglected empirical research on price, perhaps being partly explained by 
Grönroos’ comment: “Price is never a sustainable advantage.  As soon as a competitor can 
offer a lower price, the customer will be gone.” (2000:4). RM has drawn attention to the 
value of the relationship in pricing (Ford et al 2003).  This has to be offset against the 
investment and costs incurred in developing relationships (Grönroos 2000), inducing a 
positive relationship revenue over the customer life cycle (Storbacka et al 1994).  Therefore, 
prices cannot be set too high so as to potentially damage the relationship, yet high enough to 
offset the additional costs and yield a profit based upon the enhanced service value (Ford et 
al 2003). 
 
Pricing under RM therefore emphasises process – managing investment, relationships and 
costs – seeking to change market transactions in contrast to MM where ‘hidden’ relationship 
costs are high in terms of transaction cost analysis. 
 
 
FACTORS AFFECTING PRICING - CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY ISSUES 
 
Supply and Demand influences on setting pricing strategies 
 
Producing in response to demand forecasts is a conventional product-price issue.  Working to 
contract in construction means production occurs after sales are secured, hence reversing 
basic marketing theory chronology.  Each ‘product’ is client and project specific hence 
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unique.   Production and assembly techniques are generic rather than standard in a flow-line 
systems’ sense, reducing opportunities for knowledge transfer between projects, and accurate 
comparative pricing (Cassimatis 1969).  Historical cost data are only pricing indicators and 
forecasts inherently unreliable, scarce and time-lagged between data collection and 
availability (Bowen 1994; Raftery 1991).  Actual work processes are not used as a basis for 
pricing, forms of measurement being surrogate indicators of activities. 
 
Whilst effective cost control systems are essential to minimize uncertainty in construction 
(Perera 2003), few contractors know their real costs precisely, the cost curve of the firm at 
any stage varying over a wide range (Hillebrandt 2000).  Construction firms are unaware of 
their exact marginal cost and revenue curves (Raftery 1991) and calculations for the point of 
equilibrium (Gruneberg and Ive 2000).   
 
Speculative building (SB) can be an exception when the contractor is the developer and 
production precedes sale in the commercial market.  The product is also relatively fixed at an 
early stage in housing development markets due to planning and the application of standard 
house types. 
 
Traditional contracting (TC) is typical of many business operations, both inside and outside 
the construction industry, where demand – number of contracts and value of work in 
construction – is outside contractor control (Gruneberg and Ive 2000:236), industry living 
with demand fluctuations, hence firms being defensive (Hillebrandt 2000) amidst market 
uncertainty (e.g. Raftery 1991; Tavistock Institute of Human Relations 1966).  Work is said 
to go to “the best assessor of an uncertain situation rather than the most efficient to undertake 
the work” (Hillebrandt 2000:153).  Contractors can only stimulate demand where they offer 
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an additional resource, for example SB, using land, or financial packages to overcome an 
obstacle to a conventional project (Smyth 1985) – cases of increasing market share by 
product/service differentiation. 
 
Business development managers and directors of construction divisions and parent 
organisations endeavour to reduce uncertainty through courting potential clients, their design 
teams, and client programmes (e.g., Preece et al 2003) as well as information about the 
environment and competitioninly through personal contacts established through courting and 
industry networks (e.g., Al-Higzi 2002). Selling therefore mixes promotion and market 
research for contractors trying to get close to potential clients and design teams (e.g., Ngowi 
et al 2000).  Such relationship benefits are frequently lost for pricing as business 
development managers are seldom involved with estimating, project planning, and decisions 
on tender prices that determine the service offer and margin.  Directors are typically 
insufficiently involved to play this role; hence, the theoretical applicability of RM is 
compromised to the transaction approach of the marketing mix (Smyth 2000; cf. Pryke and 
Smyth 2006).   
 
 
Environmental influences  
 
The construction industry is characterised by a high degree of fragmentation as well as 
flexibility (Fellows et al 1983).  Although competition can be intense, the market is tiered, 
contractor size acting as a barrier to tiers.  In addition, competitors on one project can form a 
consortium to bid on another.  These factors can render detailed knowledge of competitors 
for any project difficult, even for those with sophisticated management information systems.  
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In the TC market it can be difficult to analyse prevailing prices, reinforced by sealed bidding 
(Hillebrandt 2000:152; Raftery 1991:139). The contractor cannot accurately know prevailing 
market prices (Hillebrandt 2000:153), price forecasting being “a matter of judgement and 
‘knowledge’ of the market” (Raftery 1991:33), and “there is no futures market … nor is 
retracking or assignment allowed” (Gruneberg and Ive 2000:238) to gauge future project 
prices. 
 
 
PROCUREMENT ARRANGEMENTS 
 
In MM, procurement is akin to place, which in construction is largely ‘received’ rather than 
created in market terms.  In RM the procurement route is an active co-selection between 
client and contractor as part of meeting client needs.  Three procurement options are 
examined, namely TC, D&C and SB, to illustrate some of the price-marketing factors.   
 
 
Traditional 
 
TC procurement is characterised by the separation of design and construction processes and 
therefore offers limited scope for contractors to compete on enhanced function or design 
quality of the finished product.  Marketing has been price dominated within MM (Smyth 
2000).  What is surprising is service as ‘product’ is not configured as part of the mix.  The 
creation of divisions to handle procurement routes inhibits contractors actively becoming 
involved with advising clients and responding with differentiated services to generic service 
needs.  Moreover, business development – the construction sales function – typically 
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terminates with pre-qualification or tendering.  This is the first breakdown in service 
continuity.  Further horizontal breaks in service are often evident as the project team put 
forward to bid for a project is not always available when work commences on site, and 
various teams may be introduced at subsequent stages as teams are reallocated to maximise 
the potential to win new projects and manage transaction costs in personnel terms (Smyth 
2000, 2004).  This militates against service continuity for fulfilling promises and service 
differentiation for adding value, specifically affecting delivery of client satisfaction and 
securing repeat business.  Moves towards partnering and supply chain management have not 
had a considerable effect upon this tendency – RC working within market structures and 
governance – RM being the management means to improve service continuity, hence 
improving service quality in adding value and meeting client needs (Pryke and Smyth 2006; 
Smyth 2005). 
 
Some major contractors have started to implement key account manager or account handler 
methods (Pryke and Smyth 2006; Smyth 2000), although typically this has led to an internal 
struggle for resources, support, and thus a loss of client orientation, hence the transaction 
mindset largely prevails and is reflected in low prices and poor value for money (Smyth 
2000). 
 
There are also related, vertical beaks in continuity of service caused by the lack of 
relationship management systems for marketing and project management between the main 
office and sites.  Therefore the experience a client receives on one project can be quite 
different on the next project.  Hence a personality culture dominates sites.  A transaction 
approach dominates pricing and hence sacrifices opportunities for managed service 
differentiation that yield client satisfaction, hence repeat business.  Whilst there is nothing 
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wrong with such approaches for individual firms, the surprising aspect is wholesale lack of 
service differentiation limiting client choice. 
 
 
Design and Construct 
 
In D&C the contractor is responsible for design.   This radically changes price-setting from 
pure service provision towards production.  In theory it could be expected that the contractor 
seeks to configure the product, and has done so within the limits of ‘buildability’.  In practice 
D&C paradoxically intensifies price issues.  Design introduces a new variable, creating every 
incentive for contractors to reduce design quality and specification in order to achieve the 
lowest bid price. 
 
Historically, some contractors have used design as a promotion tool and created a reputation 
in particular market segments or building types.  IDC provided a good UK example in the 
1980s process and pharmaceutical industries, but were taken over by Amec – a likely market 
outcome for contractors wanting to create value beyond the undifferentiated services of 
traditional contracting.  The firms absorbing such rivals tend to treat them as cash cows by 
default, if not by design, because they fail to adopt new pricing strategies that will protect 
and develop the expertise. 
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Speculative building 
 
SB incorporates design and production with the addition of a sale, usually for housing where 
current competitor prices are known. This form is the most similar to purchasing consumer 
durables. Reputation and brand have some impact in SB markets, some house designs being 
recognizably attributable to certain builders. To this extent, product differentiation is 
discernable, involving both technical specification and quality dimensions. Market segments 
are defined by income, lifestyle and house size, frequently expressed via price and number of 
bedrooms.  However, promotion and product are not dominant marketing features.  Once a 
speculative builder has secured a site they have locational monopoly, becoming price-makers 
rather than being customer or product focused.  In addition, customer purchases are often 
determined through financial packages for mortgages and part-exchange schemes, which 
conceptually are part of price within MM. 
 
A growing numbers of customers will only buy new homes.  It is still a niche market and 
does not necessarily translate into repeat business.  Particularly in buoyant markets, buyers 
frequently buy off plan or prior to completion, which housebuilders encourage by phasing 
release on large sites, hence also increasing cash flow and minimising working capital.  
Therefore, the quality of the building is often being taken on trust (Shen and Dong 2001), 
largely an RM issue in a MM market.  
 
Table 1 summarises some of the main marketing issues and options posed across different  
procurement routes.  
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
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A PROCEDURE FOR SETTING PRICING STRATEGIES FOR THE 
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 
 
Strategic motivation 
 
Therefore price is dominant.  Survival is of great strategic importance due to downward price 
pressures in fragmented markets.  Survival comes before profitability or growing market 
share via MM or through RM criteria of client satisfaction, hence repeat business.  This is 
explored across several dimensions: product-quality, market share, profitability and survival 
per se. 
 
Product-quality leadership 
Product-quality leadership is possible where contractors control design.  D&C paradoxically 
mitgates against design quality as design becomes the prime source of price competition, so 
much so that many clients take design out of contractor hands through novation under D&C.  
BOOT-type contracts, such as PPP/PFI offer opportunities where input specifications have 
been substituted by output specifications (Ive and Rintala 2006).  This can also be seen as an 
indirect form of ‘product’ control by the client.  SB does offer opportunity, however the 
control of inputs, especially land, provides a dimension of oligopoly that militates against 
this, thus MM dominates largely via price and service-cum-financial packages.  However, 
product quality has been improved as branding and mainstream advertising has grown over 
25 years, in addition to which brownfield city centre development requires more innovative 
 19 
design and technology, which is incrementally having an effect on product quality from a 
customer viewpoint (Prapas 2005). 
 
Maximum market share 
The main motivation for growing market share is to increase market power and increase 
dividend returns to shareholders from volume, particularly where margins are static.  For 
contractors the main motivation is different, whereby growth in company size permits entry 
into the next tier of the market, economies arising from access to larger projects in value 
rather than number of projects undertaken (Smyth 2006a).  However, contractors reduce 
prices to maintain market share, helping to keep prices at traditional market levels and 
constrain price increases to invest in improving services, hence maximising repeat business 
opportunities as an avenue to increase share. 
 
Gordon et al’s (1980) study suggests SBs ideally would want to maximise market share.  In 
practice, though, even the largest firms have relatively small shares compared to most 
industries (Prapas 2005) and are unprepared to lower prices to gain share. 
 
Maximum current profit 
Profit maximisation has not been a major driver in construction  (Skitmore 1989), 
opportunities to set high prices being limited for all procurement methods.  Determining 
profit margins through bidding are highly unreliable and less important than maximising the 
efficient use of working capital and cash flow management once a project is secured.  
Contractors have less capital than most industries, return on capital employed (ROCE) being 
more significant for them than profit margins.  ROCE is higher than for most other sectors 
(Gruneberg and Ive 2000).   
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Prices may be raised to levels of market skimming under exceptional circumstances, for 
example when work is very buoyant and capacity stretched. Conversely, prices may be 
lowered when the market is highly constrained to protect market share and cover overheads 
for survival.   
 
Survival 
Companies pursue survival as their major objective, especially where demand levels lead to 
overcapacity, intensified competition or changing customer wants.  Price, hence profit, is less 
important than survival.  According to Wilson and Gilligan (1997) pricing for survival can 
often mean pricing below (variable) cost to maintain cashflow.  Many TC and D&C firms 
maintain flexible capacity by astute management of resources to manage unevenness of 
demand, lumpy contracts, and project uncertainties, thus survival is a major construction 
industry preoccupation (e.g., El-Higzi 2002).  Construction is generally a highly competitive 
industry (e.g., Krippaehne et al 1992) and, although some specialists may occupy dominant 
positions and contractors may occasionally avoid bidding altogether in high intensity 
situations (Skitmore 1987), many organisations feel they have to fight for survival (Skitmore 
et al 2006). 
 
 
Determining demand 
 
In NCMT consumer goods prices are related to the current quantity of demand expressed in a 
demand curve, moderated by competition from other products that will tend to be slightly 
different in MM terms.  In TC contract bidding, the product is identical for all bidders 
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(Hillebrandt 2000).  Contractors therefore weigh the opportunity cost of bidding for 
contracts, assessing risk profiles, estimated number of bidders and other context specific 
factors rather than price in deciding whether to bid.  Such choice is only an option in a 
buoyant market. 
 
Price sensitivity 
Price sensitivity is concerned with the effect that prices have on demand, that is, price 
elasticities and quantity demanded.  In competitive tendering potential changes in prices 
affect the chances of winning contracts, therefore, contractor willingness to lower prices will 
not elicit higher demand levels, but merely increase the likelihood of securing a contract. 
Several commentators (eg.,  Cox and Ireland 2006; Green 2006; Morledge 2000) have 
pointed out the lop-sided demand nature of TC, where client/owners possess considerable 
market power, which some clients use to solicit lower bid prices in a highly competitive 
market and dangle the carrot of repeat business where there is a programme of projects. 
Thus, market conditions are important in determining pricing strategy (e.g., Flanagan and 
Norman 1985).   
 
It has been argued price is a function of prevailing market conditions rather than sensitivity 
to one product or service offer that help form the market.  This transaction approach means 
that marketing comes behind survival and that MM, particularly with a price orientation has 
been typically preferred.  Continuous improvement has provided scope for contractors to 
adopt more comprehensive marketing policies, and where this has been done RC has 
dominated – in essence another structural response as a marketing solution in line with 
historic structural responses to client procurement innovations.  While RM remains 
theoretically possible, most actions within this paradigm have been tentative.  Whilst this 
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shows that MM and RM can be dovetailed, there is minimal evidence to suggest that 
transition strategies from MM to RM are underway, however, the scope for continuous 
improvement is seriously constrained without such a move (Smyth 2005).  
 
 
Selecting a pricing method 
 
There are two conceptual techniques for setting the final price.  Cost-oriented techniques are 
mark-up pricing, target return on investment, early cash-recovery.  Market-oriented 
techniques are perceived value pricing and going rate pricing (see Mochtar and Arditi 2001).  
Mark up pricing is the standard industry textbook approach (e.g., Bartholomew 2000).  A 
production-cum-cost focus in line with MM, it largely ignores current demand, perceived 
value and competition.  It is unlikely to lead to optimal pricing, due to zero-sum games, yet 
forms part of setting price to win particular bids (cf. by Skitmore et al, 2006).  In SB, mark 
up considerations are not directly involved, but increases in prices between land purchase and 
time of house sale creates a ‘mark up’ in the form of capitalised rent on the house. 
 
Target-return on investment pricing depends on price elasticity and applies in construction 
where time is critical, for example management fee, cost plus and target cost contracts.  It 
could also come into limited play where added value is high and price sensitivity is lower, 
thus, where RM has been applied to create high levels of client satisfaction, repeat business 
and higher margins.  Perceived-value pricing can occur where image and buyers’ perceptions 
of value determines price, added service value enhancing image (Smyth 2000), supplemented 
by promotion through brand, advertising and sales techniques (Tung-Zong Cang and Wildt 
1993).  Market research is needed to establish the market’s perception of value, which in 
 23 
construction comes through RM in the sales process in the form of close understanding of 
client needs (Smyth 2000) in order to guide effective pricing (cf. Skitmore et al, 2006).  This 
is poorly conducted or neglected in construction. 
 
Value pricing is a low price for a high quality offering.  Use value pricing have been 
suggested for roadworks (Lam 2003), yet is inapplicable for construction work in the absence 
of repeat business in markets of high added value services, which remains largely absent in 
construction.  Going-rate pricing is largely based on competitors’ prices.  This applies in 
bidding, where competitor prices are unknown at a detailed level, yet assessed by bidders 
through industry networks and suppliers, and in SB where price comparisons form a primary 
means for price setting.   
 
Competitive-oriented pricing is common where firms submit sealed bids, based on 
expectations of how competitors will price rather than on a rigid relation to the firm’s costs 
or demand.  Using expected profit for setting prices makes sense for firms making many 
bids, thus learning through past experience to inform current bid prices (cf. Runeson and 
Skitmore 1999).  This fits with the price dominant element of MM in construction. 
 
Initiating and responding to price changes 
Firms can face the need to change product and service prices.  A price decrease can reduce 
excess capacity, declining market share, and induce higher market share through lower costs, 
or during economic recession.  This applies in the general to SB and tends to apply to D&C.   
Price increases might be brought about by cost inflation or over-demand.  TC prices are set 
contact-by-contract, hence price changes are manifested in post-tender negotiations, and 
through claims and variations for work that was not accurately nor fully specified for the 
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tender due to an absence of information (Pheng and Hua 2000).  Contractors try to absorb 
such changes by requiring subcontractors and suppliers to re-bid for their contracts as much 
as possible. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Two marketing paradigms have been applied – MM and RM.  MM applies in current 
practice, with price being dominant of the 4Ps.  This is the case in TC and is intensified in 
D&C as design becomes a key variable in achieving competitive pricing.  Novation has been 
used by clients to take design out of the pricing equation, however, where clients increasingly 
place design quality as a key selection criteria, for example in PPP/PFI bids, then design 
quality becomes a product factor.  Price dominates SB because builders are price-makers due 
to oligopoly derived from the physically fixed nature of land as a resource input.  SB uses the 
other three Ps – product, promotion and place (site) – to some limited degree. 
 
Price is important in TC and D&C in terms of project costs, but demand factors are important 
in terms of market activity levels.  For individual projects realistic pricing is difficult to 
establish with confidence and usually bear little relation to outturn prices.  Prices are formed 
through of assessment of what it will take to win a contract.  The effect is that contractors 
have sought survival as the primary strategic approach to pricing, marketing taking a 
subsidiary role.  Consequently, contractors largely fail to differentiate services and 
standardise services in the management of projects, hence educating clients into price 
domination. 
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RM would seem to be conceptually the most appropriate marketing approach .  Certain 
contractors applied RM piecemeal in response to continuous improvement agendas.  RC is 
within the transaction remit, hence MM, governance and market structure being taken as 
given.  RM accepts the market, but not as is, trying to change behaviour and processes by 
investing in relationship management systems that in aggregate change the market. 
 
RM offers greater potential and flexibility for pricing strategies.  Moving from transaction 
based MM to RM is an issue that contractors face – a change in pricing strategy is essential 
for any firm moving towards RM.  The change can start with raising prices in a buoyant 
market, the return being invested to deliver the added value to increase client satisfaction and 
repeat business.   In a steady market, then the investment has to be made first, so that the 
added value is demonstrated to specific clients and in referral markets through promotion and 
reputation before prices can be raised.  Investment therefore will initially lead to an increase 
in working capital and a reduction in ROCE.  As repeat and referral business increase, further 
investment can be covered, for it costs over five times more to find a new client than keep an 
existing one (Smyth 2000). 
 
In order to progress, exploration of practice is required along three further dimensions: 
general empirical work on pricing regarding contractors and clients, general empirical work 
on decision-making on pricing and mark-ups from a marketing-cum-pricing perspective, and 
specific work on attempts and constraints in using RM principles piecemeal and more 
comprehensively. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
A marketing approach  offers a perspective that is both conceptual and suited to practical 
application.  Pricing has, however, been a neglected area in marketing generally and is absent 
within the construction marketing literature.  In exploring this area, a fruitful avenue for 
educating and training practitioners has been opened up as it engages theory with practice in 
ways that economics has yet to adequately achieve.   
 
The analysis has also indicated that pricing from a marketing perspective may help inform 
price-setters in industry of the issues to take into account in specific contexts.  It may also 
inform construction firms concerning pricing strategies to adopt according to their corporate 
strategy in general and marketing in particular.  Furthermore, pricing is a key element in any 
strategic shift in marketing strategy. 
 
MM fits with NCMT.  RM accepts the market, yet is interventionist, trying to change 
behaviour and form.  It has been argued that SB is conceptually and practically closest to 
MM, whilst TC and D&C are price dominated yet theoretically more suited to RM, the paper 
analysing the scope for transition within the changing client driven construction agendas. 
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